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Case Comments
Comparative Negligence and Strict Products
Liability: Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, Inc.
The growth of strict products liability as a tort action has
provided injured consumers with a powerful weapon against manufac-
turers and sellers of defective products. The doctrinal basis for strict
products liability, its scope of applicability, and its range of potential
defenses,' however, are continually being defined through litigation.
The Alaska Supreme Court in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting
Goods, Inc.,2 contributed to this developing area of tort law by holding
that a system of pure comparative negligence is applicable in a strict
products liability suit. The Alaska Supreme Court thus became the
first jurisdiction to apply a system of "pure" comparative negligence
in a strict products liability action. The case invites attention because
by uniting comparative negligence theory with strict products liability
theory, the court has married an odd couple of tort law. One com-
mentator has remarked: "In essence, those proposing the adoption
of comparative negligence in the strict liability action are actually
suggesting a comparison of a fault doctrine (comparative negligence)
to a no-fault doctrine (strict products liability)." 4 The Butaud decision
presents a unique opportunity to discuss the conceptual basis for
uniting strict products liability theory with comparative negligence
thought. This Case Comment will suggest that clear conceptual anal-
ysis is essential to any successful marriage of the two theories, and
that the concept of fault should be the foundation of their union.
1. Strict products liability has developed primarily since Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod.
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), which first recognized strict liability
as the basis for a products liability suit.
2. 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). This decision is a modification of a prior appeal brought by
Butaud, Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975). in
which the court reversed a judgment for the defendant on the ground of an improper instruction
on contributory negligence. The Alaska Supreme Court had recently adopted a pure compara-
tive negligence system in Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975). The court, after briefing
by counsel, modified the original Butaud holding.
3. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967), and a federal district court in New Hampshire, in Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools, 339 F.
Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972), had earlier applied modified comparative negligence systems in
strict products liability suits.
4. H. Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault
and No-Fault, 14 SAN DiNGo L. REv. 337, 351 (1977).
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I. THE RISE OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE THEORIES
In order to present a clear context for a discussion of the Butaud
decision, it is necessary to examine the theoretical evolution of the
strict products liability action, traditional defenses to that action, and
the operation of comparative negligence systems.
A. Strict Products Liability as a Cause of Action in Tort
1. Evolution and Current Developments
Products liability is a creature of modern society. The advance of
the consumer age, coupled with mass production of goods, stimulated
the need for an effective cause of action in tort for consumers injured
by defective products. Strict products liability had its roots in con-
tract and negligence law, whose traditional actions presented several
difficulties to potential plaintiffs. Prior to 1916, a consumer could bring
a negligence-based products liability suit only if he stood in contractu-
al privity with the party responsible for the defect. The requirement
was subject to the narrow exception that there was no privity require-
ment necessary to bring an action against merchants and producers of
"inherently dangerous" products. 5 Justice Cardozo's landmark opinion
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.6 released products liability actions
from the restrictive chains of the privity requirement by permitting a
direct negligence action by an owner of an automobile against its
manufacturer. Prosser writes of MacPherson: "[I]ts reasoning and its
fundamental philosophy were clearly that the manufacturer, by
placing the car upon the market, assumed a responsibility to the con-
sumer, resting not upon the contract, but upon the relation arising
from his purchase, together with the foreseeability of harm if proper
care were not used."7  MacPherson effectively expanded the category
of products for whose defectiveness direct suits could be brought to
include products "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made."8  Without the restrictive requirement of
privity, pioducts liability suits became basic negligence actions in-
volving an analysis of whether the defendant was under a duty to avoid
exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm, and whether
the defendant breached that duty in such a manner to produce actual
damage or loss. 9
Gradually, attempts were made to expand liability beyond neg-
5. Poisons and explosives are two examples of products in this category.
6. 217 N.Y. 382, I11 N.E. 1050 (1916).
7. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 643 (4th ed. 1971).
8. 217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 30, at 143-45.
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ligence theory to embrace a concept of strict liability independent of
negligence analysis. The law of warranty provided the original basis
for the development of strict products liability theory.10 The theory
was that a manufacturer or seller expressly or impliedly warranted
the safety of the product. Once this warranty was breached, the
consumer had a cause of action in contract." The consumer, how-
ever, faced a difficulty with using warranty theory: the availability of
complicating contractual defenses.12  Prosser writes: "[1]t gradually
became apparent that 'warranty', as a device for the justification of
strict liability to the consumer, carries far too much luggage in the way
of undesirable complications and is more trouble than it is worth.'
3
The evolution of a strict products liability cause of action in tort
was fostered by a growing consumer consciousness.14 The theory of
"enterprise liability", i.e., that the manufacturer is in the best posi-
tion to absorb the loss sustained as a result of the injury from a de-
fective product, also became accepted. It was thought that since the
manufacturer creates the risk, profits from it, and is in the best posi-
tion to distribute the loss, he is the party most responsible for the in-
jury.,5
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,t6 decided by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in 1962, was the first case to recognize strict
products liability as an independent cause of action in tort. Widespread
acceptance of this decision led to the formal recognition of strict
products liability in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.17 Following
the Restatement's recognition of strict products liability as a cause of
10. See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
11. See J. Levine, Bkiyer's Conduct as Affecting the Evtent of Manufacturer s Liability in
Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REv. 627 (1968). Levine states that since a breach of warranty action
is a form of absolute liability, the necessity of proving negligence is bypassed: "In an action
for breach of warranty, the buyer must prove the existence of the warranty, breach of the war-
ranty, reliance on the warranty, loss or injury resulting from the breach, and breach of the
warranty as the proximate cause of the loss sustained." Id. at 628 (footnotes omitted).
12. Notice of the defective condition at the time of purchase or disclaimer of the war-
ranty by the seller or manufacturer were typical defenses.
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 98, at 656.
14. J. Levine, supra note 11, at 130.
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 97, at 651.
16. 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the prod-
uct and,
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
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action in tort, the various elements of the tort evolved through judi-
cial decision. Shortly after the Restatement's adoption of section
402A, a fundamental debate arose concerning what a plaintiff had to
prove in order to recover. The Restatement requires that the plaintiff
prove not only that a defect exists, but also that the product be "un-
reasonably dangerous."'18 The California Supreme Court, however,
expressly rejected the Restatement approach in Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp.,'9 holding that the plaintiff need only prove the existence
of a defect that proximately caused the injury.20 Neither approach re-
quires the plaintiff to prove that the defect was created through an act
foreseeable to the defendant.
The position taken by the California Supreme Court in Cronin
was that the Restatement, by associating the defect requirement with
the requirement that the product be shown to be "unreasonably dan-
gerous," burdened the "injured plaintiff with proof of an element
which rings of negligence."2' That court argued that the very purpose
of the strict products liability action was "to relieve the plaintiff from
problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence. '2 2 Thus, the
California approach may be seen as an attempt to purge the strict
products liability cause of action of any elements of culpability or
fault in the negligence sense. Indeed, the same court in Ault v. Inter-
national Harvester Co. stated: "In an action based upon strict liability
against a manufacturer, negligence or culpability is not a necessary
ingredient. The plaintiff may recover if he establishes that the product
was defective, and he need not show that the defendants breached a
duty of care."
23
The controversy over the defect requirement may be traced to a
fundamental uncertainty underlying strict products liability theory-
namely, whether the concept of "defect" carries with it any implica-
tions of fault. If fault is a necessary element of the defendant's con-
duct in a strict products liability suit, the question arises whether strict
products liability theory is still related somehow to negligence theory.
24
18. Id. For a recent case upholding the Restatement position, see Bendix-Westinghouse
v. Latrobe Die Casting Co., 427 F. Supp. 34 (D. Colo. 1976).
19. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
20. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
21. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
22. Id.
23. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (1975).
24. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965) asserts:
Thus, the test for imposing strict liability is whether the prod.ict was unreasonably
dangerous, to use the words of the Restatement. ...
It may be argued that this is simply a test of negligence. Exactly. In strict liability,
except for the element of defendant's scienter, the test is the same as that for negligence.
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2. Defect and Fault: The Relationship Between Negligence
Theory and Strict Products Liability Theory
The California approach to strict products liability actions has been
characterized as a "no-fault" theory of products liability.25 It is pos-
sible, however, that the court's disassociation of the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement from the products liability action, may not
have purged strict products liability theory of all elements of fault.
Fault is a much misunderstood concept that pervades tort law.
Fault is often confused with moral culpability, carelessness, ignorance
and stupidity.26 Prosser defines fault as "a failure to live up to an
ideal of conduct to which no one conforms always and which may
be beyond the capacity of the individual. 27 Fault in the negligence
context inheres in subjecting the injured party to an "unreasonable
risk" of harm. Whether such a risk is unreasonable depends upon a
balancing of various competing criteria. The foreseeability to the de-
fendant of the harm, its seriousness, and the value of protecting the
plaintiff from physical and emotional damage must be weighed against
the value of the defendant's conduct and the availability to the defen-
dant of alternative courses of conduct. 28 If the balance is tipped
against the defendant, society declares him to be at fault and thus
responsible for the loss.
The California approach to strict products liability reveals the
fear that by requiring the plaintiff to prove the existence of an "un-
reasonably dangerous" product, negligence theory creeps into the
strict products liability action through the concept of fault. The Cali-
fornia courts wish to relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of proving
fault by a traditional balancing of the elements of unreasonable risk.
Yet, easing the plaintiff's burden of proof does not necessarily dis-
sociate elements of fault from strict products liability theory. It may
remove only the necessity for proving fault. Whether or not a product
is unreasonably dangerous, fault may inhere in the very idea of a
defective product itself.
The concept of defect lies at the heart of strict products liability
theory, yet it is rarely analyzed by courts and is the source of much
confusion.29 The law imposes strict liability on the manufacturer or
seller who has released an unsafe product into the stream of com-
merce. To call a product "defective" is to judge it lacking of a standard
of safety and quality that is acceptable to society. If fault is defined in
25. H. Levine, supra note 4, at 337.
26. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 75, at 492-94.
27. Id., § 75, at'493.
28. Id., § 31, at 145-49.
29. For an excellent discussion of problems relating to the concept of defect, see Twerski,
From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts,
60 MARQ. L. REv. 297 (1977).
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Prosser's sense of failing to meet an ideal or standard imposed by
society, then a defective product clearly reveals the fault of the de-
fendant in not producing or selling a product that meets acceptable
standards. 30 Although in a strict products liability action the plaintiff
need not prove that fault, nevertheless it makes sense to ascribe fault
to the defendant's conduct. Professor Twerski has written: "In this
imperfect world it is not an outrageous inference that a bad defect
most probably stems from serious fault-even if the fault need not nor
cannot be established."3
If fault inheres in the very idea of defectiveness, then strict pro-
ducts liability theory is indeed related to negligence theory, although
the theories have their own identities. It may legitimately be argued
that establishing a standard of product acceptability-lack of defective-
ness-necessitates an analysis of the seriousness of the potential harm
to the consumer, the value of protecting him from physical and emo-
tional damage, the value of the defendant's conduct, and the availa-
bility to the defendant of alternative courses of conduct. In short, it
may be said that the elements of fault inhere in the manufacture and
marketing of a defective product-that is, one that presents an un-
reasonable risk of harm-even though foreseeability of harm, and thus
a hallmark of negligence is absent. It thus become3 clear that fault can
serve as a theoretical ground for interrelating strict products liability
theory and negligence theory. That theoretical ground becomes
crucial when comparative negligence principles are employed in a
products liability action.
B. Traditional Defenses to Strict Products Liability Suits
Although strict liability provides an efficient and powerful cause
of action for consumers against the merchants of defective products,
the cause of action is not so broad that it makes the manufacturer
or seller an absolute insurer of its product.32 Certain defenses may still
be raised in a strict products liability action. The defense of general
contributory negligence, in the sense of a negligent failure to dis-
cover the defect in the product, is not available.,.3 The Restatement,
however, permits a defense based upon a knowing and willful en-
counter with a known defect, and use of the product after such knowl-
edge is obtained. The Restatement refers to this defense as the as-
sumption of risk type of contributory negligence.34
In addition to assumption of risk, unforeseeable misuse of the
30. Those standards may be drawn from the particular induttry or business of the de-
fendant, from government, or society in general.
31. Twerski, supra note 29, at 326.
32. J. Levine, supra note 11, at 631.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n at 35( (1965).
34. Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are technically different defenses.
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product may be a defense to a strict products liability action. Both the
Restatement 5 and the courts36 have recognized that if the plaintiff
alters or misuses the product in a manner not foreseeable by the de-
fendant, and such misuse causes the injury, a defense may be raised."
However, the defendant is not insulated from liability if: "(1) [t3he
injury was caused by a defect in the product and not the admittedly
abnormal use to which it was subjected; or (2) [t]he injury was
caused by a defect in the product during use that was reasonably
foreseeable., 38 Thus, misuse is intimately tied to the issues of defect
and causation.39 Before the misuse defense will lie, the causal effects
of the unforeseeable conduct of the plaintiff must supersede the causal
effects of the defective product. When that occurs, the plaintiff's mis-
use bars recovery, making the defect irrelevant.
The misuse defense, however, is not equivalent to a general de-
fense of contributory negligence. Misuse is a "term of art," requiring
a double foreseeability test. Before the plaintiff's use of the product
can be labeled misuse, the use is subjected to a "reasonable con-
sumer" test of foreseeable harm, a particular form of negligence that
involves a "use of handling so unusual that the average consumer
could not reasonably expect the product to be designed and manu-
factured to withstand it."40 Once a breach of that standard is shown,
the further question arises whether the plaintiff's conduct was fore-
Assumption of risk consists of the assumption by plaintiff of the risk of defendant's negligence.
Contributory negligence is the commission of a negligent act by the plaintiff. Contributory
negligence and assumption of risk overlap. Plaintiff may reasonably or unreasonably assume
the risk of defendant's negligence. Unreasonable assumption of risk is a form of contributory
negligence in which plaintiff's negligent act is the voluntary encounter with a known risk and
subsequent use of the product with that knowledge. The Restatement continues the modem
trend of blurring unreasonable assumption of risk with contributory negligence. See Keeton,
Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LoutSIANA L. REV. 122 (1961); Noel. De-
fective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk. 25 VAD.
L. REv. 93, 119-28 (1972).
35. RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h at 351 (1965) reads: "A product
is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury
results from abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to
remove the cap . . . the seller is not liable."
Section 395, Commentj at 330 reads:
The liability stated in this Section is limited to persons who are endangered and the
risks which are created in the course of uses of the chattel which the manufacturer
should reasonably anticipate. In the absence of special reason to expect otherwise, the
maker is entitled to assume that his product will be put to a normal use . . and he
is not subject to liability when it is safe for all such uses, and harm results only because
it is mishandled in a way in which he has no reason to expect, or is used in some un-
usual and unforeseeable manner.
36. For a recent misuse case, see General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.
1976).
37. See Dale and Hilton, Use of the Product-When is it Abnormal? 4 WiLL s.tErE
L.J. 350 (1967); Noel, supra note 34, at 119-28.
38. Dale and Hilton, supra note 37, at 352.
39. The issue of causation involves an analysis of proximate causation and causation in
fact. Those concepts are discussed in the text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
40. Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 306, 509 P.2d 28, 31 (1972).
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seeable to the defendant. If the conduct was foreseeable, no defense
lies even though elements of misuse from the standpoint of the
plaintiff's reasonable expectations may be present.4'
The policy of restricting defenses in strict products liability suits
is related to the concept of enterprise liability, which imposes the
loss on the manufacturer in the vast majority of cases. In situations,
however, in which the plaintiffs fault in causing the injury is pre-
dominant, it is recognizably unjust to force the defendant to absorb
the loss. Thus, egregious fault on the part of the plaintiff makes the
defenses of assumption of risk and misuse available, barring the plain-
tiff's recovery.
C. The Rise of Comparative Negligience Theory
The doctrine of comparative negligence involves apportionment of
damages based on each party's negligence in cauing the injury. Like
strict products liability, comparative negligence is of relatively recent
origin. Comparative negligence has evolved as an alternative to the
harsh effects, in the form of a potential total bar to recovery, that con-
tributory negligence has upon a negligent plaintiff.42 At present, thirty-
four American jurisdictions have adopted some form of comparative
negligence thereby replacing the traditional defense of contributory
negligence. 3 Thirty have done so by statute and four have done so by
judicial decision.4
There are three basic types of comparative negligence systems.
The first is a system of "pure" division of damages, 45 in which the
fault of the plaintiff and the defendant are weighed against each other'
and damages are apportioned accordingly. Under a pure comparative
negligence system, the plaintiff's conduct can never constitute a total
bar to recovery. The second type of comparative negligence allows a
plaintiff to recover if his negligence is "not greater than" that of the
defendant.4 6 Under this system, a plaintiff is barred from recovery if he
41. See Dale and Hilton, supra note 37, at 382.
42. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 67, at 433; V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
3-5 (1974); Annot., 78 A.L.R. 3d 339 (1977).
43. Those jurisdictions are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Puerto Rico. South Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-55 (1970). See notes 45-48 infra for citations to the relevant
cases and statutes.
44. The four that have done so by judicial decision are Alaska, in Kaatz v. Alaska, 540
P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); California, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Florida, in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); and Michigan,
in Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977).
45. See Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Ye.llow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla, 1973);
Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972);
N.Y. Civ. Pac. LAW § 1411-13 (McKinney Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp.
1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010-019 (Supp. 1976).
46. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(h) (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
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is fifty-one percent or more at fault for the accident. The third type of
comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to recover if his negligence is
"not as great as" that of the defendant. 7 Under this system, a plaintiff is
barred from recovery if he is fifty percent or more at fault for the acci-
dent. The remaining jurisdictions follow slightly different approaches 8
D. Pre-Butaud Application of Comparative Negligence Systems to
Strict Products Liability Actions
The applicability of comparative negligence systems to a strict
products liability cause of action has generated much debate. Whether
there is a basis for comparing the conduct of the parties may depend
on the jurisdiction's theory of strict products liability. Where strict
products liability is a no-fault cause of action, there will be no measure
of defendant's fault with which to compare the plaintiffs negligence. 9
When strict products liability contains elements of fault, the conduct
of both parties can be analyzed with reference to fault °
Some comparative negligence statutes are expressly limited to
negligence based actions, and the courts have refused to extend these
statutes to embrace a strict products liability suit.51 Other jurisdictions
have refused to apply comparative negligence to strict products liability
actions because of a fear of jury confusion in allocating damages.
Comparative negligence has been applied, however, in strict liability
cases arising under the admiralty concept of unseaworthiness,s3 in
§ 58-607.1 (Supp. 1977); Nay. Rzv. STAT. § 41.141 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a
(Supp. 1973); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1977); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. AN.. art.
2212(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(West Supp. 1977).
47. See ARY. STAT. ANN. § 27.1763-65 (Supp. 1975); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (Supp.
1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (Supp. 1977); HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAIIo CODE
§ 6-801 (Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 60-258a (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp.
1977); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231 § 85 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
604.01 (West Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11
(West Supp. 1977); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-7.2 (Supp. 1975).
48. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 327D.188 (West Supp. 1977) (limited to railroad actions);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975) (slight v. gross negligence); P.I. LAws AN'S. tit. 31, § 5141
(Supp. 1976) ("concurrent guilt"); S.D. Com.iL Ia LAws ANN. § 20-9-2 (Supp. 1977) (slight v.
gross negligence).
49. See H. Levine, supra note 4, at 355; Note, Products Liability, Comparatie Negligence,
and the Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 73 (1976).
50. See J. Levine, supra note 11, at 652; Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Neg-
ligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171 (1975); Wade, On the'Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
51. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1977); Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
52. See Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. 1976); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d
795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska law).
53. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v.
Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1938); The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); Allbritton, Division of Damaqges
in Admiralty: A Rising l1de of Confusion, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoMM. 323 (1971).
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which a plaintiff's misconduct is not an absolute bar to recovery, but
may be considered in mitigation of damages as justice requires. 54
Two courts have permitted comparative negligence to be applied
in strict products liability cases. In Dippel v. Scfano,55 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied the state's "not greater than" statute to a prod-
ucts liability suit. In so doing, the court justified its comparison of the
conduct of the parties by analogizing strict products liability to negli-
gence per se. 6 Under the negligence per se rationale, the defendant's
act of placing a defective product on the market is conclusively pre-
sumed to be negligence or is negligence as a matter of law.57 Since
the defendant's conduct is a form of negligence, it becomes susceptible
to comparison with the plaintiff's negligent action,
58
A federal district court in New Hampshire declined to accept the
negligence per se rationale of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but ap-
plied the New Hampshire comparative negligence (not greater than)
statute in a products liability action in Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools
Corp.59 Under New Hampshire law, contributory negligence was a de-
fense in a strict liability action. Since contributory negligence had been
completely replaced by the comparative negligence statute before Hag-
enbuch was decided, the court felt obligated to apply comparative
negligence in the strict products liability suit. Courts in several other
jurisdictions have indicated their willingness to apply comparative
negligence in strict products liability cases should the occasion arise."'Thus, the stage was set for the decision in Butaud.
II. THE FACTS AND HOLDING IN Butaud
James Butaud purchased a Ski-Doo Olympic snowmobile from the
defendant's store in 1968. He subsequently sustained a severe eye in-
jury as the result of an accident that occurred while he was racing the
snowmobile around a track. Butaud brought a products liability action,
alleging that his injury was caused by the shattering of a defective pul-
54. Comparative negligence has also been used as a defens" in a suit based upon the
wanton, willful, or reckless conduct of the defendant. As with strict liability cases, comparative
negligence is used to compare arguably divergent types of conduct See Billingsley v. Westrae
Co., 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966). Contra, Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A,2d
409 (1976); Annot., 78 A.L.R. 3d 339, 350 (1977).
55. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
56. Id. at 461, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
57. For a recent case adopting the negligence per se rationale, see Ford Motor Co. v.
Carter, 141 Ga. App. 371, 233 S.E.2d 444 (1977).
58. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 462, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64: "Comparison of tile
failure to exercise ordinary care and negligence per se is so comm3n and widely approved in
our jurisdiction as to need no citation."
59. 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972).
60. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp, 598 (D. Idaho
1976); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Haw.), affd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Ettin v.
Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 515, 242 A.2d 663 (1968), ,frld, 53 N.J. 463, 251 A2d
278 (1969).
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ley guard. Butaud testified that prior to the accident he had inspected
the drive belt and found no signs of excessive wear.6'
The defendant contended that the cause of the accident was Bu-
taud's negligence in the use and care of the snowmobile. The defen-
dant's expert witness testified that the drive belt had been worn beyond
safe levels, and that the machine had not been properly maintained by
Butaud. Butaud admitted on cross examination that he had failed to
follow instructions in the maintenance manual and that he had failed
to return the machine for inspections. Butaud further admitted that the
snowmobile had not been sold to him as a racing model, and that a con-
version kit was necessary before racing the snowmobile was possible.62
On these facts, the case was submitted to a jury, which returned a
verdict for the defendant.63
Butaud appealed, alleging that an instrlction by the court on the
applicability of contributory negligence in a products liability suit was
overbroad.64 His argument was that Bachner v. Pearson,65 which held
that a contributory negligence instruction in a products liability action
must be limited to situations in which the plaintiff knew of the defect and
proceeded voluntarily and knowingly to use the defective product, con-
trolled the case. The Supreme Court of Alaska agreed and reversed
the lower court's judgment, holding that the defense of contributory
negligence "is limited to those occasions where the use concurs with
knowledge of the particular defect, not the general negligence of the
user as established in this case. 66
During the course of Butaud's appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court
adopted a system of pure comparative negligence to replace the old
defense of contributory negligence.67 The court modified its original
disposition of Butaud by declaring comparative negligence applicable
not only in strict products liability cases in which the plaintiff uses the
product with knowledge of the defect, but also in cases in which the
plaintiff's misuse of the product is a proximate cause of the injuries
68sustained. In announcing its decision, the court recognized that it was
"breaking new ground" in the products liability area, and justified its
decision by stating. "[W]e feel that the public policy reasons for strict
61. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 210 (Alaska 1975).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 211.
64. The disputed part of the instruction read: "Defendants claim that plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent, in their defense of this action. Contributory negligence, if proven, is a
complete defense, and bars recovery by the plaintiff, upon the theory that one should not profit
from his own wrongdoing." Id. at 211 n.l.
65. 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970). The plaintiff also relied upon Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d
136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
66. 543 P.2d 209, 212 (1976).
67. Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
68. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
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product liability do not seem to be incompatible with comparative
negligence. The manufacturer is still accountable for all the harm
from a defective product, except that part caused by the consumer's
own conduct.
69
III. ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN Butaud
The Alaska Supreme Court in Butaud became the first court to
apply a pure comparative negligence system in a strict products liability
suit. An examination of the decision and its potential effects reveals the
necessity for a rigorous analysis of the relationship of the theories in
their conceptual and policy dimensions. That analysis will suggest the
extent to which the theories should be united.
A. The Scope of the Butaud Decision
The Alaska Supreme Court modified its original holding in Butaud
by declaring that comparative negligence would be applicable "if the
appellee can establish that the appellant's racing of the snow machine
and/ or lack of maintenance of the machine was comparative negli-
gence which contributed to his injuries. '70 The court, retreating from
its earlier holding, recognized that misuse of the product as well as
assumption of risk was an assertable defense in a strict products lia-
bility suit: "The defense of comparative negligence is not limited to
those cases where the plaintiff uses the product with knowledge of the
defective condition, but also extends to those cases where the plaintiff
misuses the product and that misuse is a proximate cause of his in-
juries. '7' By the second Butaud decision, then, the court had estab-
lished that neither of the traditional defenses could be a complete bar
to the plaintiff's recovery. Under Alaska's pure comparative negli-
gence system, plaintiff's award would be "reduced in proportion to
[his] contribution to his injury."'""
In that second decision, however, the court proceeded to analyze
the misuse defense in such a fashion that confused the traditional
sense of the concept. The court seemingly eschewed the connection of
negligence elements with the misuse defense when it wrote: "We re-
alize that there is some dispute among commentators concerning
foreseeability of misuse of products as it affects the doctrine of products
liability. However, we are not convinced that the doctrine of foresee-
ability provides a viable conceptual basis upon which to predicate a
69. Id. at 46.
70. Id. at 47.
71. Id. at 46.
72. Id.
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defense in products liability cases."" The court then stated that "proxi-
mate cause" was the basic issue in a products liability suit.
74
The court failed, however, to explain how proximate cause was
the primary issue when a misuse defense was raised to a products lia-
bility claim. Proximate cause is a much abused concept in tort law and
it is often used inappropriately to describe what actually is physical
causation or causation in fact. Causation in fact is best described by
means of a "but for" test; but for the actions of the party, would the
harm have resulted?75 Proximate cause, on the other hand, involves a
prior question of whether the actor is under a duty of care to the in-
jured party. Professor Green has written:
But the term "proximate cause" is defined as requiring "foreseeability
or anticipation of some harm" as the result of defendant's conduct. This
gives a context of fault or some other form of wrongdoing, and destroys
or at least overshadows the simple idea of cause and effect. . . .Cau-
sal relation never of itself determines or imposes liability. The elements
of wrongdoing and damages must also be present.
76
Thus, when the Alaska Supreme Court embraced proximate cause as
the main issue in a products liability suit, and indicated that elements
of foreseeability must be dissociated from the misuse defense, it ap-
parently meant that the main issue in the application of the misuse de-
fense is causation in fact. Otherwise, it would have been reintroducing
elements of foreseeability and fault into the misuse defense, thereby
contradicting its earlier position that foreseeability is not involved in
strict products liability actions.
If causation in fact replaces foreseeability as the main issue in the
application of the misuse defense, then misuse as a term of art be-
comes very confused. Recall that misuse in the traditional sense is
bound by two dimensions of foreseeability.77 Foreseeabiity is first
involved from the plaintiff's perspective. Would a reasonable con-
sumer expect the snowmobile to withstand the use to which it was
subjected by him? Then foreseeability is involved from the defendant's
perspective. Should the defendant have foreseen the racing of the
snowmobile by the consumer? If the court has dissociated these two
elements of foreseeability from the misuse defense, then the identity
of that defense is completely obliterated.
The Alaska Supreme Court's analysis arguably leads to the con-
clusion that comparative negligence is available as a defense in a strict
73. Id.
74. Id. The court cited Berkebile v. Branly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893
(1975) as authority.
75. See W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 41, at 238-39.
76. Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REv. 471,475 (1950).
77. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
products liability suit whenever the plaintiff's actions cause a part of
his injuries. It no longer makes sense to call the plaintiff's conduct mis-
use or assumption of risk since those restrictive defenses are now
expanded to embrace all of the plaintiff's negligent conduct that is a
physical cause of the injury. Indeed, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Burke stated that the court may have made general contributory negli-
gence available as a defense in a strict products liability suit: "Today,
in an apparent about face, the majority concludes that such 'general
negligence' will, however, permit a reduction of the award an injured
consumer might otherwise recover.'
8
Though the court's reasoning may aid the plaintiff by using some
version of comparative negligence to remove assumption of risk and
misuse as complete bars to recovery, it also aids the defendant by ex-
panding the availability of defenses to strict products liability suits.
Indeed, plaintiffs may wonder if the removal of a potential complete
bar to recovery is worth the expanded scope of defenses assertable by
the defendant. If one policy goal of strict products liability is to place
the loss on the manufacturer because he can best absorb it, then Justice
Burke correctly perceived that: "Clearly, this underlyng [sic] policy
will be given little effect if a plaintiff is to be held responsible for his
own injuries, to the extent that those injuries are caused by his own
ordinary negligence, when he is not aware of the defect and the dan-
gers associated with that defect." 79 The majority nevertheless con-
cluded that use of comparative negligence in a strict products liability
suit "can serve to substantially ameliorate the harshness of contribu-
tory negligence while balancing the seller's responsibility to the public
with the user's conduct in contributing to his injury." ° Whether the
court is correct in its assessment of the value of using comparative
negligence in the strict products liability context requires an analysis
of how the theories interrelate in both their conceptual and policy
dimensions.
B. Comparing the Conduct of the Parties:
Causation Versus Fault
The majority in Butaud believed that the union of comparative
negligence and strict products liability theories was justified by an es-
sential compatibility of policy goals."' Indeed, the court declared that
the underlying legal theory behind products liability was not germane
to the introduction of comparative negligence theory into a strict
products liability suit:
78. 555 P.2d at 47 (Burke, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 46.
81. Id.
(Vol. 38:883
PROD UCTS LIABILITY
We find it unnecessary to conceptualize the theory of the action which
strict liability creates in order for us to apply comparative negligence
principles to strict product liability cases which result in personal in-
juries. Whether the action is characterized as negligence, warranty,
or in tort, the plaintiff must prove essentially the same elements to re-
cover.
This statement by the court is misleading 3 for if the conduct of the
parties is to be compared, that comparison must proceed upon some
conceptual basis. Thus, the basis of the defendant's liability becomes
relevant when such a comparison takes place. If the strict liability of
the defendant is to be compared with the negligence of the plaintiff,
how is this to be achieved in a logically consistent fashion? The court
maintained that:
[W]e are mindful of the theoretical argument that the strict liability of
the defendant is difficult to compare with the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff. There is a problem of measuring the parties' contribution to
the injury because there is little or no evidence of the actual conduct of
the seller to compare with the evidence of the conduct of the plaintiff."
The court's only attempted answer to the problem of comparing the
conduct of the parties rested in its analysis of causation.
In discussing the misuse defense, the court indicated that causation
was the focal point for the analysis of defenses to strict products
liability actions. Alaska follows a California no-fault approach to strict
products liability theory, and assumes that strict liability is indepen-
dent of negligence theory.85 More precisely, in those jurisdictions, strict
products liability analysis does not openly recognize the elements of
fault associated with the concept of "defect." 86 Since the court believed
that fault was unavailable as a conceptual basis for comparing the con-
duct of the parties, it turned to causation as a solution: "The defen-
dant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defective product, ex-
cept that the award of damages shall be reduced in proportion to the
plaintiff's contribution to his injury. 8 7 In the words of Justice Rabino-
witz, who concurred in the majority's decision on this point:
Perhaps it is only a semantic difference rather than reflective of a true
functional distinction but I prefer the adoption of a comparative causa-
tion analysis in strict liability cases. Thus, I would require the trier of fact
82. Id. at 45.
83. Professor Levine states: "This statement does not demonstrate a fundamental a%are-
ness of the significant disparities among varied theories of recovery. Bald assertions -Ahich con-
clusively abandon essential differences in theories of liability should never serve as a method
of resolving important legal issues." H. Levine, supra note 4, at 355 (footnote omitted).
84. 555 P.2d at 43.
85. The court expressly announced this doctrine in the first Butaud appeal. Butaud v.
Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975).
86. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
87. 555 P.2d at 46.
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to compare the harm caused by the product's defect with the harm caused
by the claimant's own negligence. . . . Adoption of a comparative causa-
tion approach would avoid the theoretical problems inherent in any at-
tempt to compare relative degrees of fault where the defendant's negli-
gence, or fault is determined by principles of strict liability.
The court's displacement of foreseeability in favor of a causation
in fact approach to the misuse defense is superficially plausible in light
of Alaska's no-fault approach to strict products liability theory. If pure
physical causation replaces foreseeability as the issue in products li-
ability actions, then the fault elements of the plaintiff's conduct can be
ignored, and thus will no longer clash with the no-fault basis of the
defendant's strict liability. The question remains, however, whether the
use of corhparative negligence in strict products liability actions on the
basis of physical causation makes conceptual sense and furthers justice
in products liability actions.
The conceptual difficulty with using physical causation as the basis
for uniting strict products liability and comparative negligence theory
is that it obliterates the identity of comparative negligence theory: if
fault is irrelevant from the standpoint of both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant, then it is difficult to see what remains of that theory, which
divides damages on the basis of the parties' respective culpability.
Nor is comparative causation truly compatible with the policy
goals of strict products liability. First, enterprise liability, as a policy
basis behind strict products liability, is downplayed when met by a de-
fense that the plaintiff's fault is so great that placing the loss on the
defendant would be unjust. If fault is replaced by pure physical causa-
tion analysis, the area of plaintiff's misconduct susceptible to compari-
son with the conduct of the defendant is greatly expanded, and certain
anomalous situations could arise. In some circumstances, the fault of
the plaintiff may be small, but his actions will physically cause a great
portion of his injury. For example, a plaintiff may not be negligent
for failing to discover the defect in his snowmobile, but his actions in
racing it, even for just a few seconds, may be the physical cause of his
accident. It is thus questionable whether eliminating fault from con-
sideration in products liability cases will reach just results in the ma-
jority of cases especially when the defect remains latent and is only
triggered by the plaintiff's actions. If the loss is placed increasingly
on the plaintiff under a causation analysis, the policy of enterprise lia-
bility will be severely restricted. The loss may not, in many situations,
be put on the party best able to bear it, but on the party who physically,
but perhaps innocently, causes more of the injury.
Comparative causation also raises other difficulties. How is the
88. Id. at 47 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
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trier of fact to sort through the various potential causes of an injury and
arrive at a quantitative assessment of how the loss should be allocated?
The court may have been engaged in wishful thinking when it as-
serted: "It is not anticipated that the trier of fact will have serious diffi-
culties in setting the percentage that the damages would be reduced as
a result of the comparative negligence of the plaintiff."' 9 It is not clear
why such a procedure is so simple, and courts may find quantifying
causation to be difficult, if not impossible, especially in situations in
which a variety of causes combine to produce an injury.
It is clear then that if causation is used to arrive at the parties'
respective liability in a products liability action, the integrity of com-
parative negligence theory is destroyed and injustice may result in some
cases. The question then becomes whether comparative negligence can
be used in a strict products liability suit in such a fashion that it pre-
serves the conceptual integrity of the two theories while furthering the
interests of justice.
From a conceptual standpoint, comparative negligence can be used
successfully in a strict products liability suit if fault is chosen as the
basis for comparing the conduct of the parties. Despite the protesta-
tions of courts in "no-fault" jurisdictions, the concept of fault is in-
volved in strict products liability theory in two essential ways. First,
the concept of defect implies fault on the part of the defendant. The de-
fendant is at fault for placing a product into the stream of commerce
that does not meet an acceptable standard of safety or quality." Sec-
ond, the recognition of the traditional defenses of assumption of risk
and misuse means that it is fault that ultimately circumscribes the area
of defendant's liability. Indeed, if fault on the part of the plaintiff could
traditionally absolve a defendant of liability, why can it not do the
lesser task of reducing it? One commentator has remarked: "The doc-
trine of comparative fault, when viewed as a tool of justice, is readily
available without either distorting the law of products liability or re-
turning us to the neanderthal doctrine of contributory negligence as a
complete bar."91
How then would a system of pure comparative fault operate in a
strict products liability action? The fault of the plaintiff would be as-
sessed through a traditional negligence analysis. For example, the jury
would be asked to consider whether the racing of the snowmobile pre-
sented a foreseeable risk of serious harm to the plaintiff, that could not
have been avoided by alternative forms of conduct. The fault of the de-
fendant would be assessed through an analysis of the defectiveness of
his product, since the plaintiff need not prove that the defect was cre-
89. Id. at 46.
90. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
91. Twerski, supra note 29, at 331.
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ated by negligence. For example, the jury would be asked to consider
whether the defendant's defective pulley guard met a standard of ac-
ceptable safety and quality. To the extent that the snowmobile failed
to meet acceptable standards, the jury would assign fault to the de-
fendant. The defendant's fault would thus relate to the degree of his
product's defectiveness, which in turn is assessed by analyzing the
seriousness of the harm to which the plaintiff was exposed, the value of
protecting the plaintiff from such harm, and the burden of alternative
courses of conduct for the defendant. The jury would then be asked to
weigh the degree of the plaintiff's fault with the fault of the defendant
and assign a percentage to each. The damages would then be divided
accordingly.
Even if pure comparative fault is used in a strict products liability
cause of action, the question of the extent to which it should apply re-
mains. The traditional defense of assumption of risk may be retained
intact except that a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery will be re-
moved. The fault associated with the plaintiffs willful encounter with a
known defect is compared with the fault of the defendant in placing
the defective product into the stream of commerce.
Application of comparative fault becomes more complicated with
respect to the misuse defense. Professor Schwartz has advocated the re-
tention of unforeseeable misuse as a complete bar to the plaintiff's re-
covery. 92 Thus, where the defendant cannot foresee the misuse, the
plaintiff's actions completely supersede the product's defect, and
there is no basis on which to ascribe fault to the defendant for purposes
of comparison with the plaintiff's misuse. But when the misuse is fore-
seeable to the defendant, a strong argument can be made for comparing
the conduct of the parties.93 Since foreseeability is involved from the
perspective of both sides, the trier of fact merely weighs the fault of the
plaintiff in subjecting the product to a use that a reasonable consumer
could not expect the product to withstand, against the fault of the de-
fendant in releasing a product unable to withstand such a foreseeable
misuse.
From a policy standpoint, the abolition of a complete bar to recov-
ery in the assumption of risk defense furthers justice by holding the
defendant at least partly responsible for his defective product. Justice
may be served by retaining unforeseeable misuse as a complete bar be-
cause the defendant's fault is superseded in that the plaintiff's extreme
fault makes the defect in the product irrelevant. Comparing fault
in situations of foreseeable misuse furthers justice by holding both
parties responsible for results that they could anticipate. It should be
noted that in each of the situations just mentioned, the strict liability
92. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 180-81.
93. Id.
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policies of inducing the defendant to improve his defective product,
and of holding him responsible for the risk he created are consistent
with making the plaintiff responsible for his own contribution to his
injury. The theory of enterprise liability will be partly or wholly re-
stricted just as it has traditionally been wholly restricted when the
plaintiff's conduct has constituted a defense to strict products liability.
The question remains whether comparative fault should be used
as the Alaska Supreme Court used comparative causation, to make the
general negligence of the plaintiff susceptible to comparison with the
defendant's conduct.94 The answer to this question, since the policies of
product improvement and responsibility for risk are roughly consistent
with comparative fault, depends on the desirability of the policy of
enterprise liability in cases in which the plaintiff's fault is not great.
Enterprise liability serves the interests of justice in these situations by
placing the loss on the party best able to bear it. Although the plaintiff
may be partially at fault for the injury, enterprise liability insures that
the defendant, who also is responsible, and who is usually in a stronger
financial position, bears the loss. Thus, as a policy matter, comparative
fault should not be used to expand the area of plaintiff's loss of recovery
beyond the traditional defenses of assumption of risk and unforeseeable
misuse, and foreseeable misuse.
In addition to the foregoing conceptual and policy advantages of
using comparative fault, other advantages attend a comparative fault
system. First, the effect of a discrepancy between fault and physical
causation is avoided and the loss is assessed through relative degrees
of culpability. Second, it is arguably easier to measure comparative
degrees of fault than comparative degrees of physical causation; the
former task is in any event more familiar to American courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Alaska Supreme Court claimed to be applying com-
parative negligence theory in the strict products liability action in
Butaud, close analysis reveals that the court was really using compara-
tie causation to allocate damages in what it believed to be a just
manner. The court's opinion suffers from a lack of proper use of con-
ventional terminology as well as a lack of any substantive analysis of
the issues underlying both comparative negligence and strict products
liability theories. The result is that the court does not make a successful
marriage of the two theories, and through its comparative causation
analysis, it may have undermined the policy goal of enterprise liability
94. Professor Schwartz would allow a comparison of the parties' conduct in cases in
which the plaintiff failed to discover or foresee dangers that a reasonable man would have
discovered. Id.
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underpinning strict products liability theory. Successful marriage of
comparative negligence theory to strict products liability requires a
fault-based analysis that protects the integrity of both theories while
furthering the interests of justice. The successful application of a com-
parative negligence system in a strict products liability action awaits
a court willing to wrestle with complex and often divergent concepts
and policy goals.95
Jeffrey M. Goldsmith
95. As this article was going to press, California became the !;ccond jurisdiction to apply
pure comparative negligence principles to strict products liability actions. See Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. RPTR. 380 (1978).
